News on U.S. government agencies, U.S. politics, companies doing business with U.S. federal government. Read U.S. national and local news. This site is not affiliated with United States Government.
(EMAILWIRE.COM, March 19, 2010 ) Fremont Ohio Criminal Defense Lawyers Take Note: ‘14-Day Clause’ May Affect Clients
New Clause Applied to Multiple Interrogations of an Individual
March 19, 2010: (Fremont, Ohio) Whether you are a Fremont, Ohio criminal defense attorney or a criminal defense lawyer in another part of the country, a recent Supreme Court decision may affect you and your clients.
The United States Constitution has many familiar Clauses - - the Free Speech Clause, the Establishment Clause, the Confrontation Clause, and others. But until last month, most lawyers, judges, and scholars scholars had never heard of the “14-Day Clause.” Yet the Supreme Court applied this newfound Clause to decide Maryland v. Shatzer. Obviously, that Clause does not exist, instead, the Court seemingly invented it to achieve a desired result in the Shatzer case.
In that case, Michael Shatzer, Sr., was serving a prison sentence on a child-sexual-abuse charge. During his imprisonment, the government investigated another abuse allegation against Shatzer that stemmed from an earlier incident. A detective assigned to the case went to ShatzerÂ’s prison, took him into a room, and read Shatzer his Miranda rights. Shatzer declined to make a statement without an attorney; therefore, the detective ended the interview, released Shatzer back into the general prison population, and closed the investigation.
Two and a half years later the police received new leads, thus, another detective went to the prison to interview Shatzer. That detective also read Shatzer his Miranda rights, but this time Shatzer signed a waiver and made incriminating statements.
Prosecutors charged him with several sex offenses. He moved to suppress his statements, arguing that under Edwards v. Arizona, once he invoked his right to counsel, the police could not attempt to speak with him again. In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, police may not engage in further interrogation without providing counsel unless the suspect himself initiates further communication.
The prosecution argued that Edwards did not apply to Shatzer because there was a break in custody between when he initially invoked his right to counsel and when he subsequently gave his statement more than two years later. Shatzer responded by arguing that: (a) the passage of time is not relevant under Edwards, and (b) there was no break in custody because he was imprisoned the entire time.
The Supreme Court agreed with the prosecution and held that ShatzerÂ’s written waiver was valid, thus, his statements at the second interrogation were admissible. The Supreme Court reviewed its decisions in Miranda and Edwards and observed that confessions are important tools for law enforcement.
The Court then stated:
The protections offered by Miranda, which we have deemed sufficient to ensure that the police respect the suspectÂ’s desire to have an attorney present the first time police interrogate him, adequately ensure that result when a suspect who initially requested counsel is reinterrogated after a break in custody that is of sufficient duration to dissipate its coercive effects. (Emphasis added.)
In plain English, this means that once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, the police do not have to leave him alone forever. Rather, the police may attempt to reinterrogate the suspect if:
• The police give the Miranda warnings again;
• There is a break in custody between interrogations; and
• The break in custody is sufficiently long enough to erase any possible element of police coercion.
But how long is “sufficiently long enough?” And what, exactly, does a “break in custody” mean? The Supreme Court gave somewhat surprising answers to these questions.
First, the court set a rare bright-line test for the sufficient-duration issue. The court initially observed that in Shatzer’s case “there (was) no doubt that (the break in custody) lasted long enough to meet (the) durational requirement.” Normally, the Supreme Court would leave things there and decline to address other factual scenarios - - such as a break in custody that lasted one week or one year.
But the Supreme Court made a rare maneuver in Shatzer and said it would be “impractical to leave the answer…for clarification in future case-by-case adjudication; law enforcement officers need to know, with certainty beforehand, when renewed interrogation is lawful.” Thus, without much explanation, the court simply stated, “It seems to us that period is 14 days.”
As to the break-in-custody issue, the court didn’t make a bright-line rule, but it did find that there was a break in custody in Shatzer’s case even though he had been incarcerated the entire time. The court made a distinction between incarceration pursuant to a conviction and Miranda custody. The court reasoned that during Shatzer’s incarceration, he was able to visit the prison library, exercise, participate in educational courses, communicate with visitors, and generally live among other inmates, guards, and prison workers. In essence, the court reasoned that while Shatzer wasn’t a free man, he still retained certain freedoms even while in prison. The court juxtaposed this against the police-dominated atmosphere of an interrogation room, where suspects are “isolated with their accusers.” Based upon this distinction, the court found that once the first detective released Shatzer back into the general prison population, there was a break in custody until the second detective arrived more than two years later.
This seems like a tenuous distinction, but it is a very important one. If there could be a “break” in Shatzer’s custody while he remained imprisoned, courts could probably find a “break” in custody in almost any case. Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted within its decision, our country has a high recidivism rate. Indeed, many inmates throughout the United States may be suspects in unsolved crimes. Thus, it is likely that the fact pattern in Shatzer will begin to repeat itself in prisons throughout this country.
Similarly, in light of Shatzer, a criminal defense attorney in Fremont, Ohio, or any other city across the country, should anticipate that police will repeatedly try to interrogate suspects who have previously exercised their Miranda rights, but who arenÂ’t incarcerated. The police simply have to mark their calendars and wait 14 days between each attempt.
Whether this rule is legitimate or not can be debated, but lawyers should be aware of it and advise their clients accordingly.
Andy Mayle is an attorney with Mayle & Ray, Mayle, LLC, based in Fremont, Ohio. Mayle, Ray & Mayle offers the following practice areas among others: Ohio personal injury lawyer, criminal defense attorney Port Clinton, and wrongful death lawyer Tiffin Ohio.
We are pleased to offer you this exciting, new, and entirely free professional resource. Visit our Free Industry resource center today to browse our selection of 600+ complimentary Industry magazines, white papers, webinars, podcasts, and more. Get popular titles including:
